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Turning Reconciliation on Its Head:         
Responding to Sexual Violence                         
Under the Khmer Rouge 
Katrina Anderson1 
 
I wonder how both sides can reconcile if one side is the victim and 
the other is the perpetrator.  And the perpetrators have not accepted 
their mistakes.  If they admit their actions, it would be up to me to 
forgive them or not.  It depends on how they confess.  I almost 
died, but they have only compensated my loss with the word 
“sorry”. . . . 
     Tang Kim, Khmer Rouge rape survivor2 
 
Tang Kim turned twenty-three years old in 1976, shortly after the Khmer 
Rouge defeated the American-backed Lon Nol government and unleashed a 
reign of terror on the countryside of Cambodia.  One night, a group of 
soldiers seized Tang Kim and brutally raped her in a field near her village.  
She hid for three days in a leech-infested swamp and witnessed thirty-three 
families murdered.  Of eight women who fled the village, she was the only 
one to escape alive.  
In a recent film produced by the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DC-Cam),3 Tang Kim breaks her silence for the first time in twenty-eight 
years.  The importance of this film cannot be understated, for she is the first 
Cambodian woman to speak publicly about the crimes of rape that occurred 
during the five-year period of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) under the rule 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), commonly known as the 
Khmer Rouge.4  Between 1975 and 1979, millions of Cambodians either 
starved to death or were killed, and countless more were tortured or were 
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deprived of food.  No one has ever been held accountable for these crimes, 
nor has any serious attempt at national reconciliation ever been made.   
Thirty years after the fall of the DK regime, the Cambodian government 
finally agreed to bring some members of the CPK leadership to trial for 
domestic and international crimes committed during their reign of terror.  In 
October 2004, the Cambodian National Assembly approved a long-debated 
piece of legislation that created a special tribunal within Cambodia’s court 
system, called the Extraordinary Chambers (EC), for the purpose of trying 
senior leaders of the DK regime.5  With trials expected to begin sometime in 
2005,6 it is widely hoped that the EC will open the door to reconciliation by 
creating a historical record that documents how the Khmer Rouge came to 
power and why the regime caused such massive social disruption.   
While the tribunal may succeed in holding accountable some of the most 
responsible actors for the Khmer Rouge crimes, the EC alone is an 
insufficient mechanism for national reconciliation.  The purpose of this 
article is to challenge the singular approach to reconciliation through the use 
of judicial mechanisms that are blind to and ineffective with respect to 
certain crimes, and instead to promote creative approaches focused on 
grassroots social repair. The tribunal reflects a “top-down” approach to 
accountability that has dominated transitional justice discourses since the 
Nuremberg trials.  This theory presumes that the responsibility for the 
crimes rests in the upper echelons of CPK leadership, not among the lower-
level officers.7  Hence, any historical record generated by the EC will omit 
culpability on the part of lower-level officers, depriving Cambodians of the 
opportunity to confront this class of perpetrators and learn about their role 
in the regime.  The driving theory behind the EC therefore subverts a key 
purpose of creating a tribunal—to create a factual, unbiased, historical 
record of what happened and why.8  Individual accountability for the top 
Khmer Rouge leaders is not likely to make a significant difference in the 
lives of victims of rape and sexual abuse who live in close proximity to 
their rapists and who struggle daily with the legacy of those horrible crimes 
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that remain unacknowledged by the rest of Cambodian society.  For this 
reason, a clear majority of Cambodians recognize that other mechanisms 
will be necessary to repair Cambodia’s torn social fabric, even though a 
similar proportion of the population believes the tribunal provides a critical 
opening for a national dialogue about the past.9  Supplemental mechanisms 
are necessary to address crimes committed by lower-level officers; this is 
particularly true of sexual violence against women committed under the DK 
regime.  Accountability and reconciliation strategies designed from the 
bottom-up, rather than the top-down, will more accurately meet the goals of 
average Cambodians to face the past and to chart the future of their country.    
Part I of this article describes the sexual crimes committed under the DK 
regime and offers a hypothesis to explain why these crimes have been 
omitted from the historical narrative of Khmer Rouge atrocities.  The 
silence surrounding crimes against women has affected the drafting of the 
EC Statute and has limited the possibility of holding the perpetrators 
accountable for rape.   
Part II of this article analyzes the limited capacity of the EC to address 
crimes of sexual violence and predicts that such crimes will not figure 
prominently in the prosecutions for four principal reasons.  First, as 
mentioned above, the EC’s narrow mandate precludes the possibility of 
prosecuting those who actually perpetrated the sexual crimes—the lower-
level cadre.  Second, gaps in the EC Statute, such as the omission of rape as 
a domestic crime and the use of outdated terminology, would make the EC 
prosecutor’s task extremely difficult if such prosecutions were undertaken.  
Third, the EC cannot possibly be immune from the hostility towards 
prosecutions on the basis of sexual violence that exists in Cambodia’s legal 
system.  Finally, the collection of evidence—always difficult in the case of 
sexual crimes—will be particularly challenging for the EC prosecutors 
given the passage of time between the commission of the crimes and the 
establishment of the tribunal, compounded by the emotional and 
psychological impact of testifying for victims.   
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The combination of these four factors virtually guarantee that 
prosecutions for rape at the EC will be rare and inadequate; nevertheless, 
observers of the tribunal must pressure the EC to investigate and to 
prosecute sexual crimes.  Part III of the article offers four recommendations 
to insure that prosecutions for rape are pursued in a way that will empower 
women victims and witnesses.  These include institutional 
recommendations for the EC, as well as procedural protections that proved 
successful at the two fully international tribunals, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).     
Cambodia’s choice to embrace a model of retributive justice through the 
EC does not necessarily preclude the use of restorative justice mechanisms 
in Cambodia.  Part IV acknowledges that given both the importance of 
uncovering the truth about crimes of sexual violence and the unlikelihood of 
successfully prosecuting sexual crimes, supplemental means of addressing 
these crimes should be explored.  For instance, traditional Cambodian or 
Buddhist methods of dispute resolution may provide a window for victims 
and perpetrators to confront each other and to move towards forgiveness 
and reconciliation.  Part IV analyzes some possibilities for local justice 
initiatives in Cambodia that could be used to confront the buried history of 
sexual violence.  This section also draws on the lessons learned from local 
justice models in other post-conflict situations in an attempt to predict 
similar obstacles and to correct them before they occur.   
There is no doubt that confronting the buried history of sexual crimes in 
Cambodia will take a serious commitment of time and resources: first to 
create an accurate historical record, next to hold actors accountable, and 
finally to promote long-term reconciliation.  This article recognizes that 
silence can no longer be the appropriate response.  Across Cambodia, 
women like Tang Kim are waiting to tell their stories. 
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I.  SEXUAL CRIMES UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE 
When the DK regime fell in 1979, the international community entered 
Cambodia for the first time in five years and discovered graphic physical 
evidence of killing and torture on an absolutely staggering scale.  At least 
1.5 million people—20 percent of the Cambodian population—died during 
the four-year Khmer Rouge regime.10  Of these, between 500,000 and one 
million people were executed, while others died of starvation and disease.  
The vast physical evidence in mass graves (such as those at Choeung Ek 
only fourteen kilometers from Phnom Penh) and the torture devices left at 
Tuol Sleng (an elementary school converted into several torture chambers) 
offered powerful evidence of the Khmer Rouge regime’s methodological 
acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.   
At first, the scale of the destruction blurred distinctions between the 
victims.  While the vast majority of the victims were ethnic Khmers, they 
also included Cambodians of Vietnamese decent and Muslim Chams.  Not 
even Buddhist monks and nuns were spared.  In the Khmer Rouge’s quest 
to purge “enemy elements” from every sector of society, they killed men, 
women, the elderly, and children.  No sector of Cambodian society was 
immune from persecution.11   
The forensic evidence alone did not indicate that women had suffered 
differently than men.  Skeletal remains do not reveal evidence of rape or 
sexual assault, and the dead took their stories with them.  During the 
documentation of the Khmer Rouge crimes, women survivors remained 
silent on the subject of rape.  Thus, it was assumed that rape had not been 
used as a weapon of war in the way it had under other genocidal regimes, 
such as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.   
Also, in contrast to other regimes, the Khmer Rouge was widely known 
to have espoused a policy strictly forbidding rape and even went so far as to 
outlaw sexual relations of any kind outside of marriage.  The regime viewed 
sex as subversive behavior that would distract people from what ought to 
have been the focus of their work, the agrarian revolution.  Although the 
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regime wanted to project an image of the revolutionary organization, or 
Angkar,12 as morally pure, the policy was less rooted in morality than it was 
in the Maoist philosophy that valorized efficiency above all else.13  Morality 
provided a convenient excuse for controlling all aspects of civilian life.   
The strict prohibition on sex protected some women from sexual violence 
because men considered the risk of transgression too high.  But as 
researcher Kalyanne Mam concluded after conducting the most extensive 
set of interviews of women survivors to date, the Khmer Rouge policy had 
the perverse effect of encouraging sexual crimes against many women.14  In 
effect, the Khmer Rouge policy “drove the practices underground.”15  In 
order to conceal evidence, soldiers killed women immediately after raping 
them.  In the film about her life, Tang Kim also describes this practice: 
They raped all of those who were sent to be killed.  They would 
never rape a woman otherwise….You [the filmmaker] have said 
that you were looking for people who committed moral offenses 
with Khmer Rouge soldiers, but you could not find such a case.  
The Khmer Rouge would never do anything like that; both the 
rapist and the victim would be executed if it was found out.  So, 
they would only rape those who were condemned to die.16 
Moreover, as Tang Kim indicates, the laws punished both the perpetrator 
and the victim of sexual violence for committing a sin against the Angkar.  
Women were too afraid to report sexual abuse; they were told that if they 
informed the Angkar of the crime, they would be killed.17  Like Tang Kim, 
who went to live in a cooperative after surviving her rape but refused to 
show her face to anyone, women went to great lengths to avoid the attention 
of the Angkar.  A culture of blame directed at the survivors of rape persists 
in Cambodia, preventing survivors from coming forward with their stories.  
Women in rural Cambodia are particularly fearful because they may live 
close to their perpetrators and would risk disrupting key social networks by 
naming them. 
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The perpetrators were not only protected by laws that deterred reporting, 
but also by the decentralized structure of the Khmer Rouge command.  This 
structure kept senior commanders from discovering the crimes of 
subordinate soldiers.18  One victim reported that at one prison, women 
prisoners would be raped until they became pregnant, then they were killed 
to conceal the evidence.19  The guards’ crimes were never discovered 
because the prison was physically isolated and the guards controlled who 
entered and who left.20  Not surprisingly, the Khmer Rouge policy did not 
deter rape from occurring but instead created a culture of impunity around 
the act of rape.  If perpetrators could conceal all evidence by killing their 
victims, they could uphold the illusion of a moral society wholly devoted to 
serving the Angkar.   
Most Cambodians—including women who survived the Khmer Rouge 
regime—believed that rape did not occur during that time because of the 
lack of preserved physical evidence of rape, the regime’s severe regulation 
of sexuality and its unanticipated effects, and the forced silence of women 
victims.  Systematic rape apparently did not occur on the massive scale 
witnessed in certain other genocidal regimes such as Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, but rape and sexual abuse certainly did take place under the 
Khmer Rouge.  The present challenge for Cambodians is how to address 
these buried crimes.  Most of the physical and testimonial evidence has 
vanished with the death of the victims.  It is imperative to create a 
mechanism for addressing these crimes—one that will allow Cambodians to 
face a buried past, shatter the myth that rape did not occur under the Khmer 
Rouge, and move towards genuine community reconciliation. 
II.  RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 
The EC Statute is the result of a protracted and highly political 
negotiation process between the United Nations (UN) and the Cambodian 
government.21  In 1997, the Cambodian government invited the UN to assist 
the country in establishing a Khmer Rouge tribunal.22  The UN Secretary 
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General soon after appointed an international and independent Group of 
Experts, which marked the first international response to the Khmer Rouge 
crimes since 1978.  The Group’s  mandate was to evaluate the existing 
evidence and nature of the crimes committed, to determine the feasibility of 
bringing perpetrators to justice, and to evaluate the options for trials before 
international or domestic courts.  In February 1999, the Group of Experts 
issued its final report calling for the creation of a fully international tribunal 
similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).23  The Cambodian 
government rejected this recommendation, preferring a fully Cambodian 
court to preserve its sovereignty.24  Eventually, a compromise was reached 
to create a “mixed” tribunal composed of a one-seat majority of Cambodian 
judges who would primarily apply Cambodian law.25  In December 2004, 
the UN and the Cambodian government agreed on a budget to fund the 
tribunal and initiated the UN’s process of raising funds among donor 
nations.26  Assuming fundraising efforts are successful, the EC is projected 
to begin trials sometime in 2005.   
Among observers within and outside Cambodia, significant doubts 
remain as to whether fair trials are possible with the EC operating as a 
special court within the Cambodian court system, rather than as a separate 
international tribunal.27  Nevertheless, the EC is the most promising 
accountability mechanism proposed to date, and time and opportunity yet 
remains to fix its flaws.  This section discusses the primary obstacles to 
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in hopes they can be addressed before 
the commencement of the EC. 
A.  Limited Personal Jurisdiction 
One of the more controversial aspects of the tribunal is its prosecutorial 
scope.  The UN Group of Experts recommended that the tribunal have a 
mandate to prosecute “those persons most responsible” for the serious 
crimes committed during the DK regime, including “senior leaders” as well 
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as “those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the most serious 
atrocities.”28  The language in the final EC Statute narrows the scope of 
jurisdiction to those “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those 
who were most responsible for the crimes.”29     
The language of the EC Statute precludes the possibility of holding 
accountable a broad range of lower-level commanders who might bear a 
significant portion of responsibility for the crimes committed.30  It was 
intended to exclude current political leaders, most notably Prime Minister 
Hun Sen, who held minor positions in the CPK.  The EC Statute presumes a 
theory of why the crimes were committed: the top CPK leadership 
conspired to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on 
a mass scale by developing the machinery to carry them out.31  Historian 
Steven Heder argues that the EC’s lack of jurisdiction over the “small fish” 
prevents prosecutors from exploring an equally plausible alternative theory 
of why the crimes occurred—that the crimes resulted from an abuse of 
authority in which subordinate soldiers acted on their own volition without 
the knowledge of the senior leaders.32   
Cambodians have stated that they want a tribunal in order to understand 
what went wrong under the Khmer Rouge so as to prevent such events from 
ever happening again.  Sixty-five percent of Cambodians perceive the 
lower-level Khmer Rouge cadre as the perpetrators,33 but the public is 
clearly split on how to hold them accountable.  Forty-one percent consider 
the lower-level soldiers to be both victims and perpetrators; however, a 
majority does not pity them,34 and 67 percent stated that they could not 
forgive the soldiers who actually perpetrated the crimes against them.35  
Historical accounts show that lower-level cadre were often persecuted by 
CPK party leaders, but the experiences of these soldiers were too diverse to 
lump them all into either the “victim” or “perpetrator” category.36  By 
shifting the focus away from the experiences of the foot soldiers toward 
those of the senior leaders, the EC’s restricted mandate will likely not lead 
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us any closer to understanding how CPK policies developed, and how these 
policies were upheld, changed, or rejected on the ground.   
The restricted mandate also has serious implications for prosecutions of 
sexual violence.  Prosecutors would face an enormous challenge in proving 
that the senior leaders ordered the lower-level soldiers’ acts of sexual 
violence.  Senior leaders were unlikely to commit rape themselves due to 
the Khmer Rouge policy forbidding it, so a prosecutor would have to show 
that the defendant held command responsibility over the lower-level cadre 
who actually committed the rape. 
The theory of command responsibility allows a senior leader to be held 
accountable for the actions of a subordinate if the defendant knew, or 
should have known, that his subordinates were committing abuses, and the 
leader either failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
those abuses or failed to punish the perpetrators.37  This doctrine reflects the 
belief that commanders are more culpable than subordinates because they 
either ordered the crimes or failed to supervise and punish those who 
committed them.  Senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge maintain that they did 
not order sexual crimes, and the well-known policy prohibiting rape 
supports their claim.  But even if a senior leader did not order the rape, a 
prosecutor may still be able to prove command responsibility if there is 
evidence that the commander was negligent in preventing the rape.38  
Evidence indicates, however, that in areas where rape occurred, most senior 
leaders did not know about the crimes of their subordinate officers.  More 
often, lower-level Khmer Rouge soldiers committed rape in secret and 
concealed all evidence of the crime.  As Kalyanee Mam explained,  
[I]t was imperative that all evidence of the crime was completely 
destroyed and higher officials did not find out about the rape that 
had taken place.  It was not enough to simply threaten their victims 
not to speak against them.  Victims had to be killed in order to 
remove all traces of the crime.39   
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Testimonies from survivors indicate that senior leaders also did not have 
effective control of their subordinates’ actions, at least in certain locations.  
Researchers at the Documentation Center of Cambodia have gathered 
evidence suggesting that rape was widespread and systematic against 
members of ethnic minority groups in Cambodia, including the Vietnamese, 
Cham, and Chinese, especially when imprisoned.40  Reports vary as to the 
extent of sexual violence in prisons, where women comprised 6.4 percent of 
the population.41  In his authoritative book on the infamous “S-21” prison in 
Phnom Penh, David Chandler states that sexual assault was infrequent in 
the prison due to  close monitoring by prison guards.42  Female guards were 
even called to witness the interrogation of female prisoners in order to 
prevent torture of a sexual nature.43   
In contrast, one of Mam’s interviewees told her how soldiers repeatedly 
raped all of the young female prisoners at a provincial prison called “Munti 
#15.”  The former prisoner explained, “[t]hose people probably tried to 
prevent the top leaders from finding out, because [at Munti #15] there were 
[ten] soldiers that guarded us, so it was easy for them to conceal what they 
were doing.  There was no one coming in or out.”44  Chandler’s and Mam’s 
reports are actually consistent, for they suggest that rape was more likely to 
occur when soldiers were least likely to be monitored.  Guards in a prison 
such as Tuol Sleng, where senior leaders passed through regularly or had 
frequent communication with the prison officials, were punished severely 
for the slightest infraction.  But in jungle camps where prisoners were 
isolated from the scrutiny of Khmer Rouge leadership, soldiers acted as 
they pleased.   
A successful prosecution for rape depends on prosecutors’ ability to show 
that senior leaders either ordered or knew of and failed to prevent or punish 
rape, and that they held effective control over their subordinates in those 
areas where the majority of the rapes seem to have occurred.  The available 
evidence about how rape was perpetrated under the Khmer Rouge supports 
the opposite conclusion, that the majority of crimes resulted from an abuse 
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of authority by subordinates rather than a top-down conspiracy devised by 
Khmer Rouge commanders to use rape as a weapon of war.  The fact that 
sexual crimes were driven underground—causing extreme secrecy and 
destruction of physical evidence—makes it nearly impossible to prove that 
senior leaders promulgated a policy to use rape “with the intent to 
destroy”45 a civilian population, or “as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack”46  against a civilian population.  While it makes sense from a moral 
perspective to pursue the “big fish” and hold them accountable before the 
EC, a major consequence of this approach will be a lack of accountability 
for many serious crimes, including rape, and the absence of these crimes on 
the historical record. 
B.  Omission of Rape as a Domestic Crime  
The EC Statute includes three domestic crimes (murder, torture, and 
religious persecution)47 and five international crimes (genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, crimes against cultural property, and crimes 
against internationally protected persons).48  Rape was not included as a 
domestic crime under the EC Statute even though Cambodia’s 1956 Penal 
Code—the criminal code in force at the time of the DK regime—lists rape 
as a crime.49  There are many possible explanations for the omission.  It 
could be attributed to the widespread belief that rape did not occur during 
the DK era because it was forbidden by the official CPK policy.  As 
discussed in Part I, physical evidence of rape did not exist.  Rape and sexual 
abuse were also underreported by women, who remained silent out of 
shame or fear.  Furthermore, during the time the EC Statute was being 
negotiated, scant research had been undertaken on the subject of sexual 
crimes against women under the Khmer Rouge.  Consequently, the 
international outrage against rape and sexual violence committed by the 
genocidal regimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia—outrage that facilitated the 
aggressive prosecution of these crimes at the ICTR and ICTY—did not 
exist in Cambodia.50   
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Despite the lack of physical evidence, the fact that further inquiries of 
rape and sexual assault of Cambodian women were not conducted with the 
aim to include sexual crimes in the EC Statute is still disappointing.  By the 
time of the EC’s ratification in October 2004, researchers had gathered 
enough testimony from women survivors to allow for the possibility that 
rape had occurred.  The lessons of other investigations of mass atrocities 
had also begun to focus on crimes against women.  In recent years, the 
ICTR and ICTY have declared rape a war crime,51 a crime against 
humanity,52 an act of genocide,53 and torture,54 and thereby greatly 
contributed to the international jurisprudence on gender-related crimes.55  
The EC Statute’s omission of rape as a specific domestic crime is especially 
troubling given the great strides that these tribunals’ judgments have made 
towards recognizing the historical use of rape as a weapon of war.  
 C. Use of Outdated and Restrictive Terminology 
Prosecutors will still have the option of charging rape as an international 
crime.  Although the Geneva Conventions do not specifically list rape as a 
war crime, rape is now considered a grave breach under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which prohibits “willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health” and “inhuman treatment” of civilians.56  
Furthermore, ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence have helped move international 
law towards acceptance of rape as a war crime. 
Unfortunately, the drafters of the EC Statute chose to incorporate 
outdated terminology from international humanitarian law instead of the 
more inclusive and more current statutory language from the two main 
international tribunals.  Article 6 of the EC Statute does not list rape or 
sexual violence as a war crime.  The drafters rejected a more expansive 
definition of war crimes based on the “grave breaches” provision of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention or the ICTR Statute, which include “rape, 
enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault.”57   
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On the other hand, the language in Article 6 does not limit the acts 
chargeable as war crimes to the acts listed therein, as evidenced by the 
phrase “such as the following acts.”  Naming rape as the constituent act of a 
war crime would be preferable to charging defendants with one of the other 
acts that are explicitly named in Article 6, such as “torture,” “inhumane 
treatment,” “great suffering,” or “serious injury to body or health.”  A 
charge on one of these bases denies the sexual and gender-based aspects of 
rape and its distinct physical and psychological harms that deserve 
particularized remedies.  Furthermore, as Kelly Askin points out, the 
vagueness of the charge is also “wholly useless as a deterrent.”58  
Considering the attitudes of Cambodia’s legal system towards rape, it is 
optimistic to assume that rape will be separately prosecuted as a war crime 
without significant pressure from the international community. 
Although the drafters did list rape as one of the constituent acts of crimes 
against humanity in Article 5, this Article notably omits other types of 
sexual crimes, such as abuse or enslavement, that survivors claim also took 
place under the DK regime.  Due to differences in the language between the 
EC Statute and the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, it is unclear whether the EC 
will find the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence authoritative in interpreting the 
definition of crimes against humanity based on rape.   
The jurisprudence of the ICTR and the ICTY has significantly developed 
the definition of rape and sexual assault under international law.  For 
example, the ICTR broadly defined “sexual violence,” which includes rape, 
“as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive.”59  The tribunal then defined coercive 
circumstances expansively as those that include “threats, intimidation, 
extortion, and other forms of duress,” such as the existence of armed 
conflict or the presence of armed militants.60  Subsequent decisions have 
also expanded the definition of sexual crimes that qualify as crimes against 
humanity to include sexual assault.61  The ICTR’s precise definition of rape 
as a sexual act of force plus coercion is important because it recognizes the 
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inherently coercive aspect of armed conflict.  The international judges in the 
EC will likely push for the application of the ICTR and ICTY’s rich 
jurisprudence on sexual violence, but it might be too optimistic to assume 
that the Cambodian judges will draw on these progressive definitions.  
D.  Hostility of the Cambodian Justice System Towards Crimes of Sexual 
Violence  
The failure of the EC Statute to include rape as a domestic crime, and the 
use of outdated legal terminology to describe rape, may be explained in part 
by the general treatment of rape under Cambodian domestic law.  Even if 
the legal inadequacies and evidentiary problems discussed in subsections A 
through C above are adequately resolved, any prosecution for rape at the EC 
would still encounter a legal culture that is extremely hostile to such 
prosecutions.  The Cambodian legal system’s failure to deter rape is evident 
from three sources of information: the underreporting of rape, the low rate 
of rape prosecutions, and the even lower rate of rape convictions.62  Human 
rights organizations report that even while incidents of rape dramatically 
increase every year, barriers in the judicial system remain that deter many 
women from coming forward.  These barriers occur at every level of the 
process, from investigation to trial, and are firmly entrenched in 
Cambodia’s legal system and culture. 
Several reasons contribute to the failure of the system to prosecute rape.  
First, corruption within the legal system has led citizens to distrust the 
promise of due process at trial.  Law enforcement officers frequently break 
Cambodian law to broker settlements between the parties, including forcing 
the victim to accept monetary compensation or even a forced marriage to 
the perpetrator.63  Though Cambodian law requires the state to shoulder the 
costs of prosecution, victims must pay bribes to initiate investigations and 
pay for their medical certificates (the one critical piece of evidence in a rape 
case).64  The cumulative cost of bribes necessary just to bring a case to court 
makes the cost of prosecuting a rape case prohibitive for most victims. 
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Second, the intense social stigmatization of rape victims in Cambodia 
discourages women from reporting rape for fear of bringing unbearable 
shame upon themselves and their families.  A sense of deep shame 
frequently accompanies a victim’s fears for her physical safety; for 
example, a woman may refuse to tell her story because it would lead to both 
acts of revenge by her perpetrator and recrimination and alienation by her 
community.65  The president of Licadho, a major Cambodian human rights 
organization, explained that most people in Cambodia believe rape is not a 
crime because of a popular myth that men cannot control themselves.66  
Court officials, however, are not immune to such views, thus creating the 
third problem—misinterpretation of the law.   
Judges have been known to acquit rape cases based on erroneous 
grounds, such as when the victim is not a virgin or when the perpetrator is 
related to the victim.67  Though Cambodia’s rape laws are far from ideal—
for example, the law fails to define consent or capacity for determining it—
it is the judges’ unwillingness to suspend personal beliefs and to apply the 
correct law that more often harms women.  One human rights organization 
that monitors rape reported that in 2004, judges sentenced suspects in only 7 
percent of cases.68 
Finally, Cambodia’s citizenry has a profound distrust of the legal system.  
Perpetrators know that they can influence the outcome of a case by bribing 
a judge or the appropriate court official, and the public reacts to this sense 
of impunity by failing to report crimes or to file complaints.  This is 
particularly true where the perpetrator is a state actor.  Out of twenty-five 
cases brought to trial against a state actor in 2003, none resulted in a 
conviction.69 
E.  Collection of Evidence 
Gathering evidence to prove crimes against women, particularly sexual 
crimes, has historically been very challenging due to a variety of social and 
practical factors.  The passage of time between the commission of the crime 
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and the trial is the most obvious practical obstacle to collecting evidence for 
rape cases.  This is especially true in the Cambodian context.  After thirty 
years, any physical evidence of sexual crimes that may have existed has 
deteriorated to the point of uselessness, and testimonial evidence is 
inevitably lost due to the death of victims and the fading of witness memory 
over time.   
The emotional torment and psychological impact of rape, which often 
endure long after the physical effects have passed, create enormous barriers 
for investigators.  Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is common in rape 
victims and causes them to experience impaired memory, especially during 
times that they are forced to recall the triggering events.  Eighty percent of 
rape survivors in Rwanda were identified as “severely traumatized” after the 
conflict ended.70  Investigators in the former Yugoslavia found that repeated 
questioning re-traumatized rape victims, and some who retold their stories 
multiple times suffered such severe depression that they attempted or 
committed suicide.71  Past experience shows that the passage of time buries 
the trauma but does not in itself help women recover; for example, some 
Japanese “comfort women” did not reveal their stories for decades after 
World War II.72  Similarly, twenty-eight years passed before Tang Kim 
could talk about her rape.  In both cases, the wounds caused by sexual 
violence had not yet begun to heal until the victims could talk about their 
experiences. 
Another obstacle hindering the collection of evidence is the reluctance of 
women to report rape because of social consequences such as ridicule, 
humiliation, rejection, or ostracism.73  This occurs more frequently in 
traditional and patriarchal societies where a woman’s worth is directly 
proportional to her chastity and virginity.74  In societies where a sexual 
crime against a woman is a crime against her family and community, 
families often ostracize the victim to save face.75  Investigators who 
interviewed women in post-conflict Guatemala found that few women 
talked about their experience of rape because they had deeply internalized it 
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as one of many anticipated consequences of the military’s campaign to 
destroy indigenous communities.76  Victims denied even to themselves that 
they had been raped and described only their general sadness about the 
impacts of war.  Moreover, untrained investigators lacking the experience 
and expertise to ask the relevant questions only buried the crimes deeper.   
It should also be noted that investigators and prosecutors can harm 
women by overemphasizing sexual crimes, which occurs when researchers 
interview with preconceived notions about the violence and fail to listen to 
the victims’ narratives.  Aryeh Neier explains how researchers in the former 
Yugoslavia were reluctant to focus on rape when interviewing women 
because, in doing so, they de-contextualized the crime and failed to 
represent the extent of women’s harms.77  When rape is accompanied by the 
murder of family members, imprisonment, food deprivation, or other gross 
human rights violations, it is absorbed into a much longer narrative of 
suffering.  A narrative disconnect happens when victims of mass atrocity, 
who tend to think in terms of an uninterrupted experience of suffering, 
explain their story to prosecutors or investigators, who are trained to isolate 
facts to support elements of crimes.  Separating the crime of rape from other 
crimes against women during wartime can cloud a more complete 
understanding of all human rights abuses committed against women during 
war.78  In Cambodia, rape took place within the context of human rights 
abuses against women and ranged from forced separation from family 
members to extreme forced labor that led to miscarriages and starvation.79  
Prosecutors and investigators that are properly trained to listen to women 
victims will learn to appreciate the full range of harms that women have 
experienced and give sexual violence the appropriate emphasis. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS  
The previous section focused on the obstacles to prosecuting rape at the 
EC, but these obstacles are not insurmountable if attention and resources are 
devoted to them early in the process.  The short- and long-term advantages 
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of prosecuting rape cannot be overstated.  First and most importantly, 
prosecutions could expose the truth about women’s experiences during the 
Khmer Rouge and break the silence that threatens to write them out of 
history.  Second, charging commanders for rape strongly condemns such 
behavior and reverses the balance of power between victims and 
perpetrators.80  Third, holding perpetrators criminally responsible is one of 
the strongest deterrents against the use of rape as a weapon of war in future 
conflicts.  Fourth, prosecuting rape builds the jurisprudence on rape as an 
international crime, educating judges about gender-related crimes and 
normatively influencing the way that judges apply the law in rape cases.81  
Fifth, prosecutions would help educate Cambodian judges about sexual 
violence, which would lead to a better application of Cambodia’s rape laws. 
Finally, generating public discussion on issues of sexual violence would 
likely challenge popular (sexist) assumptions about rape and prompt 
legislative reform to strengthen legal protections for rape victims.   
Despite its shortcomings, the EC must be supported as the first step 
towards accountability in the long process of reconciliation.  Trials before 
the EC will begin to formulate a factual record about the events that took 
place under the DK regime.  The EC’s flaws may prevent many of the real 
questions about rape and other crimes from being answered, but it will open 
a much-needed national dialogue on the events of the past that will generate 
momentum for supplemental forms of reconciliation.   
At this point, no one can know whether Tang Kim is a lone rape survivor 
of the Khmer Rouge regime or one of thousands who has feared coming 
forward for the past thirty years to speak about her rape.  Such questions 
about the historical record are fair, but they cannot be answered unless the 
EC increases both its outreach and access.  In its current form, it is safe to 
predict that very few women, if any, will testify about rape before the EC.  
However, EC officials can implement certain changes at relatively low 
practical cost to ensure that victims of sexual violence will be treated with 
respect should they decide to testify.  These four recommendations include: 
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(1) design special procedural protections for witnesses and victims of sexual 
violence; (2) create a victims and witnesses unit within the EC to address 
short and long-term care for those testifying before the EC; (3) offer gender-
sensitivity trainings emphasizing issues of sexual violence to EC officials 
including judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and (4) appoint women as 
judges and prosecutors.  
A.  Procedural Protections  
Unlike the statutes that created the other international and ad hoc 
tribunals, the EC Statute does not authorize the EC judges to create their 
own rules of procedure and evidence. And at the time of this article, the 
Cambodian National Assembly has yet to approve rules of procedure and 
evidence for the EC.  Consequently, what rules will apply and who will 
draft them is impossible to predict.  Regardless of how the general rules of 
procedure and evidence are established, the EC should follow the example 
of other international tribunals and craft special rules to address the needs of 
victims of sexual crimes.  
Because Cambodian jurisprudence on sexual violence is so 
underdeveloped, the tribunal should adopt rules that reflect the valuable 
lessons learned from the ICTR and ICTY in dealing with such cases.  For 
example, the rules of procedure for those tribunals do not require 
corroboration of a rape victim’s testimony.82  They also make evidence of 
the victim’s prior sexual conduct inadmissible and acknowledge that 
consent is not a defense to rape when coercive conditions are present.83  
And the ICTR’s Furundzija decision84 marked a significant departure from 
harmful assumptions, such as the diminished credibility of victims suffering 
from rape trauma disorder, a form of PTSD, who receive counseling.  The 
court wrote, “Even when a person is suffering from PTSD, this does not 
mean that he or she is necessarily inaccurate in the evidence given. There is 
no reason why a person with PTSD cannot be a perfectly reliable 
witness.”85 
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The EC Statute calls for the protection of victims and witnesses but 
specifies only one procedure to do so—holding private, in camera, 
proceedings for judges to review sensitive evidence.86  Although the EC 
Statute does not specify other protective procedures, neither does it limit 
them.87  The rules of procedure should specify measures that will provide 
for a victim’s security,88 prevent further traumatization,89 and protect a 
victim’s privacy.90   
B.  Victims and Witnesses Unit 
To provide comprehensive care, the EC should establish a Victims and 
Witnesses Unit that can coordinate the special needs of victims.  The EC 
Statute currently designates three offices—investigating judges, co-
prosecutors, and judges—to share the responsibility of caring for the 
victims.91  The lack of clearly designated roles reveals that caring for 
victims was not a priority for the drafters of the EC Statute, but the EC can 
rectify this problem by creating a unit that will provide comprehensive care 
and ensure that a victim’s needs do not fall through the bureaucratic cracks. 
C.  Gender Sensitivity Trainings 
Educating officials involved with the EC on gender-sensitive procedures 
is critical to addressing crimes against women successfully.  Two important 
lessons can be drawn from previous tribunals.  First, it is important to make 
women feel both physically and psychologically safe.92  To help create a 
safe environment at the EC, investigators and prosecutors must be trained to 
ask questions in a way that empowers women to tell their story.  
Specifically, investigators should be trained to ask appropriate questions 
and to listen to the clues in a woman’s story that suggests evidence of 
sexual violence.  The second lesson speaks to the healing nature of a trial 
for the victim, in that no trial should re-traumatize a woman who has 
suffered from sexual violence.  The bottom line is that women victims or 
witnesses must be given a “genuine choice between remaining silent and 
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coming forward.”93  In other words, tribunal officials should communicate 
to women that they are the actors who hold the power to testify or not to 
testify.  All other protective measures for victims and witnesses should also 
stem from this baseline.  
Admittedly, capacity-building programs aimed at the Cambodian 
judiciary have not had much success over the years because of corruption 
within the Cambodian judiciary.  The Cambodian political and economic 
elite influence judicial outcomes in nearly every case, despite attempts to 
train judges to apply international standards for fair trials.  Judicial trainings 
in Cambodia now carry the aura of futility; consequently, donors 
increasingly refuse to fund them.  But as Steve Heder points out, the 
problem is not the judiciary’s incapacity to analyze the law critically and 
exercise independent judgment; rather, “the problem is the determination of 
key political players to prevent training and knowledge from being put to 
use against their fundamental political and economic interests.”94  Thus, the 
international community has a responsibility to monitor the political 
influence exerted on judges and other actors within the EC.  A problem as 
entrenched as corruption will not be reversed overnight, but the 
international spotlight on Cambodia’s legal system creates an unusual 
window of opportunity to educate members of the legal system about 
international standards of fairness.    
D.  Women as Officials of the Extraordinary Chambers 
The experience of other tribunals has revealed, unsurprisingly, that when 
women serve in high-level capacities on the tribunal, crimes against women 
are more likely to be addressed.  The ICTR’s Akayesu decision, which 
contributed significantly to the development of rape jurisprudence under 
international law, originally did not include rape in the indictment.  
Akayesu was the former mayor of the Taba commune who was accused of 
allowing those under his authority to rape mostly Tutsi women who had 
sought his protection. International human rights groups derided the 
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prosecutor’s omission of rape in the original indictment, but many attribute 
the prosecutor’s late decision to amend the indictment to the presence of a 
woman judge on the panel who pushed for the inclusion of those crimes.95  
As this example illustrates, appointing women as judges, prosecutors, and 
investigators will increase the likelihood that sexual violence will be 
prosecuted before the EC.   
By serving in these high-profile positions, women help break the silence 
surrounding crimes against women.  As Kelly Askin notes, 
[T]heir presence in decision-making positions represents a 
monumental advance over women’s traditionally minimized role 
and status in international law bodies or organizations, including in 
prior international war crimes tribunals.  Consequently, the 
jurisprudence of the United Nations Tribunals reflects women’s 
participation.96   
Including women as EC officials and training them on the international 
legal standards for sexual violence will allow women to develop a 
responsible jurisprudence for crimes of sexual violence in Cambodia and 
take the lead in reforming this area of domestic law.     
IV.  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA 
As the previous sections have addressed, crimes against women may not 
figure prominently in the historical record created by the EC, or give 
victims of sexual violence the chance to face their perpetrators and demand 
justice.  Just as crimes against women have been silenced since the Khmer 
Rouge era, so have the women’s particular desires for reconciliation.  No 
formal research has been undertaken to ascertain women’s goals in the 
reconciliation process, or on their views concerning which strategies will 
best effectuate these goals. 
In a recent survey distributed to readers of DC-Cam’s monthly magazine, 
Searching for the Truth, respondents were asked a variety of questions to 
solicit their feelings about the Khmer Rouge and national reconciliation.97  
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A large number of respondents, 67 percent, claimed that they could not 
forgive the Khmer Rouge commanders, and 54 percent said that they would 
be unable to forgive the lower-level cadre.98  Most also linked their capacity 
for forgiveness to accountability, with 57 percent stating that a tribunal 
offers the best mechanism for forgiveness.99  But the survey contributes 
little to an understanding of whether women tend to favor a tribunal over 
other forms of reconciliation.  Although the respondents were drawn from 
diverse geographic regions and professions, they were “predominantly 
male,”100 and gender did not factor into the analysis of their preferences.  
The obvious precondition to introducing a reconciliation strategy that 
addresses crimes against women is to conduct comprehensive research into 
women’s experiences with the Khmer Rouge and their views on how best to 
face the past.101   
What the DC-Cam survey does suggest, however, is that even if the EC 
succeeds in convicting a few senior leaders, the tribunal will not heal the 
deep social ruptures in Cambodian society.  With over half of Cambodians 
claiming that they are unable to forgive the lower-level cadre, reconciliation 
will remain elusive without a comprehensive transitional justice strategy102 
that incorporates a restorative justice model.  In contrast to the retributive 
justice model of legal tribunals, restorative justice reorients the process with 
a victim-centered approach that allows the victim to tell her story to an 
unbiased decision-maker.103 
The EC’s enduring focus on the retributive justice model has prevented 
the Cambodian government from calling for restorative justice mechanisms.  
There has been some discussion, however, within Cambodian civil society, 
and among international observers, about designing a local justice 
mechanism—that is, one that derives from Cambodia’s specific 
sociocultural, historical, and legal culture—to promote reconciliation on the 
community level.  Local justice mechanisms have been used in other post-
conflict contexts instead of using the “top-down” approach of accountability 
present in international tribunals, which rarely take into account the specific 
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needs of local communities.  The underlying premise of local justice 
mechanisms is that reconciliation strategies designed from the “bottom up” 
offers a more genuine process of social repair because local populations are 
more invested in the process.   
An appropriate local justice mechanism could help expose the truth about 
sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge and lead to lasting reconciliation. 
Taking the emphasis off of the individual perpetrator and placing it on the 
victim and the community-at-large would help address the community-wide 
problem of sexual violence that has endured since the Khmer Rouge era.  
On the other hand, local justice mechanisms often have patriarchal roots 
that could endanger any legitimate attempt at reconciliation between female 
victims and their perpetrators.  By drawing primarily on the example of 
Rwanda’s gacaca process, this section will explore how Cambodians can 
open channels of dialogue about sexual crimes under the Khmer Rouge 
through a local justice initiative.   
A.  Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts and Other Local Justice Models 
Perhaps the best-known example of local justice following a period of 
mass atrocity is Rwanda’s process of post-genocide community 
reconciliation called the Inkiko-Gacaca (literally, the Gacaca Jurisdictions).  
These local courts are based on customary dispute resolution mechanisms 
called gacaca and are named for the grass upon which community leaders 
sit when hearing villagers’ complaints.  These informal and ad hoc sessions 
persisted throughout Rwanda’s period of colonization, dealing with issues 
such as land rights, property damage, marital disputes, and inheritance 
rights.104  The Gacaca Jurisdictions were created in 2001 by the Rwandan 
government under the leadership of President Paul Kagame in order to 
address two problems: the failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the national courts to further the goal of national reconciliation 
or attain justice for most Rwandans, and the unsustainable burden of 
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maintaining the 120,000 accused perpetrators of the genocide within 
Rwanda’s fragile prison system.  
Three laws provide the framework for Rwanda’s approach to 
reconciliation.  The 1996 Genocide Law gives the ICTR and the national 
courts jurisdiction over “Category One”105 offenders, or the main leaders of 
the genocide, notorious killers, and perpetrators of acts of sexual torture.  
The 2001 Gacaca Law provided that the gacaca process would hold lower-
level Hutu offenders accountable for their role in Rwanda’s genocide and 
put on “trial” those offenders classified as Category Two (perpetrators or 
accomplices to intentional homicides or serious assaults that led to death), 
Category Three (other serious assaults), or Category Four (property crimes).  
This law also expanded the scope of Category One crimes to explicitly 
include rape, which is defined differently than “sexual torture” under 
Rwandan criminal law.106  The reforms to the Gacaca Law passed in 2004 
give jurisdiction to gacaca courts over pre-trial proceedings for all cases, 
even for Category One crimes, that prosecutors did not transfer to regular 
national courts prior to March 15, 2001.107 At the trial phase, gacaca courts 
will retain jurisdiction over all perpetrators except those accused of 
Category One crimes. 
Gacaca, the only model of its kind in the world, is an experimental 
process that sets out to achieve both reconciliation and justice at once.  It 
emphasizes reconciliation by giving perpetrators the opportunity to confess 
their crimes, with the promise of reintegration into society after they do so.  
Now in its initial investigative phase, gacaca calls together victims and 
perpetrators to face each other in a public meeting.  Defendants are given 
the opportunity to confess publicly before those who survived the genocide, 
while victims and community members may offer additional information.  
Trials will take place in either the gacaca or the national courts.  
Community judges are empowered to reduce sentences of a perpetrator 
whom they deem has made a full and truthful account of his crimes. With 
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over 750 gacaca courts now established, the Rwandan government hopes to 
establish over 9,000 by 2006 when the trial phase is set to begin.108   
Inkiko-Gacaca functions similarly to the traditional Rwandan gacaca 
process, but the modern system has some important distinctions.  Most 
importantly, its focus is on extremely serious crimes rather than customary 
disputes.  Also, the new system is created and controlled by the state rather 
than local authorities.109  Other important modernizations include the 
popular election of community judges, called inyangamugayo, rather than 
the appointment of community elders to the position, and mandatory, rather 
than voluntary, participation by defendants in the process.110  And unlike 
the traditional gacaca process that excluded women, the coordinating 
committees of inyangamugayo include a balanced representation of women.   
At least in the initial investigative phase, women appear to be 
participating in the gacaca at a higher rate than men, attending more often 
and asking more questions than male audience members.111   From a 
gendered perspective, one of the key advantages to the gacaca process is 
that it enables women victims to tell their stories in the way that they wish 
to tell them.112  Many Rwandan women were humiliated when they testified 
as victims before the ICTR, where defense counsel demanded that they 
explain their experience of rape in explicit detail.  Doing so forced the 
women to commit a major cultural taboo and to risk being ostracized in 
their communities.  Samantha Power recalls that in one case, after the 
defense counsel demanded that a victim explain on the stand what she 
meant by “raping,” she recalled her reaction: 
I didn’t know what to do.  I looked around me for help.  It is not 
something you do in Rwandan culture.  They asked me if it was for 
a man to put his penis in a woman’s vagina.  I nodded.  They said I 
had to repeat it.  So I repeated it.  But then I started to cry because 
of the shame.  For a Rwandan girl to use such words in her life, 
you don’t know: it’s awful.113   
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In contrast, the gacaca courts offer victims the chance to tell their own 
stories in their own words, to confront their perpetrators, and to demand an 
apology.  The narrative event takes on a uniquely Rwandan—and highly 
emotional—quality.  Power describes the modern gacaca as a “public 
confessional process that recalls both the Salem Witch Trials and a 
Mississippi Christian revival.”114  
Time will tell whether this public confessional process will spur social 
repair generally and whether, in particular, it will provide an effective 
opening  to address gender-based crimes that occurred during the Rwandan 
genocide.  The proportional representation of women as judges and the high 
rate of female citizen participation generated hopes that crimes of sexual 
violence would be adequately addressed.  The lack of formal evidentiary 
rules also provides an opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable for rape 
without the hurdle of presenting medicolegal evidence that was impossible 
to collect in post-genocide Rwanda.  Although some women have been re-
traumatized by testifying before the gacaca courts because of the highly 
charged atmosphere Power describes, others have found it healing.  One 
woman reported:  
There were about 2,000 people there.  When I testified, people kept 
quiet . . . . The judges said nothing.  I said it all without shame.  
Immediately after the war, I was ashamed and always started 
crying.  But since then, it is better.  People encouraged me and the 
women in the [support group for rape survivors] have helped me 
too.115 
Although more instances of rape and sexual violence have been reported 
at gacaca than in national courts, these crimes have still been underreported 
during the pre-trial phase of gacaca.  A comprehensive study of gacaca by 
Harvard University found three main reasons why women hesitated to 
report rape before gacaca: fear of re-traumatization through telling the story, 
guilt over attributing a Category One crime to the perpetrator and thereby 
increasing his sentence to the death penalty, and shame or embarrassment at 
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speaking publicly.116  Victims and witnesses also fear that their testimonies 
will open them to acts of retribution by perpetrators or their families.117   
Women are reluctant to testify because of gacaca’s insufficient 
procedural protections. Originally, women were required to either testify 
publicly before a full gacaca panel of nineteen judges or the general 
assembly of 100 members. They could also write their testimony, but it 
would then be read aloud.  The 2004 reforms have improved the procedures 
to provide for in camera hearings before one judge. These reforms came 
after gacaca earned a reputation of insensitivity to women’s concerns, and 
the reputation is difficult to repair.  Additionally, closed-door hearings in 
small communities, where people will automatically assume the victims 
were raped, are “necessarily public” and ultimately inadequate to address 
women’s feelings of shame, depression, and stigmatization.118  Further, 
human rights groups have derided gacaca for the government’s failure to 
train or adequately prepare the community judges and have called into 
question the Rwandan government’s ability to ensure fair trials, given its 
abysmal human rights record.119  Indeed, training of community judges has 
been minimal, and even though women are decently represented, in most 
cases these women are also village elders whose traditional value systems 
do not prioritize women’s safety.120 
The gacaca experiment, as well as local justice experiments in East 
Timor, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere, can provide instructive lessons on 
restorative justice for Cambodians.  As discussed above, implementing 
procedural safeguards, such as the ability for rape victims to give 
confidential and private testimony, is critical to any community-based 
process.  Procedures must also be established to ensure independence and 
neutrality among the community adjudicators.  Rwanda has tried to correct 
the influence of local leaders over the gacaca process by holding popular 
elections for community judges.  Gacaca has shown that although local 
leaders promote community participation, their involvement can also re-
institutionalize social power relationships that disenfranchise female 
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victims.  A similar struggle exists in East Timor’s Commission for Truth, 
Reception, and Reconciliation, a process that has attempted to reintegrate 
militia members into local communities through reconciliation meetings.  
Adapted from a traditional justice mechanism, the process allows militia 
members to confess their crimes to village elders and promise not to repeat 
them.121  One of its flaws is that communities rely on local leaders to 
provide them information on perpetrators, which leads to criticism that 
leaders too often protect their own interests.   
The importance of practical considerations in this calculation cannot be 
overestimated.  East Timor’s Commission has run into problems when its 
sentences conflict with the formal justice system’s trials against militia 
leaders.122  Similarly, the failure to specify the relationship between Sierra 
Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone has generated both confusion and due process concerns.123  In 
the Cambodian context, the relative jurisdictions of the EC and some local 
mechanism must be distinguished at the outset.  A second issue is funding.  
Relying on community donations could open the door to corruption, but 
outside funding would guarantee that victims and perpetrators are not 
treated differently depending on their social and financial status within the 
local community.  However, international support is unlikely, given the 
“donor fatigue” with the EC and a general skepticism of experimental local 
justice mechanisms.  A commitment on the part of Cambodia’s government 
to sponsor such initiatives could offer the necessary independence and 
neutrality to make the process fair.  Similarly, a financial commitment on 
behalf of the government would convey its interest in long-term 
reconciliation and stability that could inspire funding from other sources.   
No community-level reconciliation mechanism can be a completely 
neutral and independent process, but by learning from these other systems, 
Cambodians can anticipate and address these flaws from the outset.  Like 
Rwandans, Cambodians have repeatedly expressed the need to confront 
their perpetrators publicly and to force them to explain their actions.  
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Indeed, the impulse to confront and to demand answers—even more than 
the need to know the facts, even more than a desire for revenge—is what 
Cambodians mean when they say they want to know “why” the horrors 
occurred.124   Thus, these experiments with local justice mechanisms may 
inspire Cambodians to formulate their own grassroots approach to 
reconciliation. 
B.  Local Justice in Cambodia  
1.  Buddhism  
Some have suggested that a restorative justice mechanism for Cambodia 
could draw on principles and teachings from the Middle Path of Buddhism, 
which preserves social harmony through a spirit of compromise.125  
Cambodia is an overwhelmingly Buddhist country and the monastery 
represents the focal point of most communities.  The Buddha taught that 
forgiveness begins when the victim puts aside anger and instead acts out of 
love, and when the perpetrator takes responsibility for his or her actions and 
faces their consequences.126  As depicted in the film about her life, Tang 
Kim turns to the teachings of the Buddha in order to deal with her anger.  
One of the monks who helped guide her decision to become a nun quotes 
from the Dharma: “‘Vindictiveness ends in vindictiveness.’  If someone 
does something bad to you and you take revenge, the vindictiveness will 
never end.”127  Buddhist legal thinking thus prioritizes two virtues—
understanding the consequences of one’s actions and promoting a positive 
state of mind.128   
In Cambodia, as in most of Southeast Asia, a rich legal tradition based on 
principles of Theravada Buddhism was rapidly replaced by western legal 
values in the nineteenth century.129  The monk as the traditional resolver of 
disputes and the temple as the locus of reconciliation gave way under 
French colonialism to a professional class of judges; dispute resolution 
moved from the center of the community to the courthouse.130  These 
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modern systems were characterized by popular distrust from their inception, 
and the social disruption of the DK era soon after prevented effective 
institution building.131  As a result, today the Cambodian legal system is 
plagued by widespread corruption and is more widely distrusted by the 
Cambodian people than ever.  In contrast, the long historical role of the 
monastery in community life allowed it to survive the enormous disruption 
of the DK regime.  For example, loyal villagers rebuilt pagodas soon after 
the Khmer Rouge fell, and survivors housed the remains of relatives in 
stupas across the countryside.  Buddhist pagodas became important sites of 
remembrance for those killed during the regime.132  Nevertheless, the DK 
period caused a deep rupture in the practice and traditions of Buddhism 
from which the institution has yet to truly recover. 
Even though history suggests more hope for the monastery than the 
courtroom to be the locus of reconciliation, Cambodians have not expressed 
enthusiasm for the Buddhist reconciliation mechanisms proposed thus far.  
While 74 percent of Cambodians favor a tribunal,133 only 15 percent of 
Cambodians endorse a Buddhist ceremony in which perpetrators would 
come forward to confess their crimes and ask for forgiveness.134  But it 
would be a mistake to assume based on this statistic that Cambodians favor 
no involvement of Buddhism in the reconciliation process.  The concept of 
apology, particularly public apology, is foreign to Cambodian society.  
Furthermore, the survey proposed Buddhist reconciliation as a process in 
itself, detached from the familiar role that Buddhism has always played in 
community reconciliation techniques.  Given the widespread corruption 
within Buddhist institutions in Cambodia, the population’s distrust of these 
institutions, and the historical gap in knowledge and tradition caused by the 
Khmer Rouge regime, any reconciliation mechanism that incorporates 
Buddhism must necessarily accommodate Cambodians’ ambivalence 
towards it.   
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2.  Traditional Dispute Resolution: Somroh-somruel  
Rural Cambodia has a traditional process of informal conflict resolution 
called somroh-somruel.135  This process is a form of third-party mediation136 
based on Buddhist principles of peacebuilding that takes place at the village 
level, or phum.137  The most common types of disputes resolved through 
this process are land and fishing lot disputes, neighborhood quarrels, and 
domestic violence.  When a dispute occurs, the parties may approach a 
respected village chief, an elder, a commune chief, or a Buddhist monk to 
mediate.  The mediator often recruits village elders and lay religious 
teachers to help in the resolution.  Many community members are involved 
in a long-term effort to compensate the victim, heal broken relationships, 
and allow the parties to return to communal life.  The conflict may be 
resolved by referring to the Dharma or to codified, community-based krom 
(norms), chbab (laws or rules), and vineay (modes of discipline).  On the 
community level, Buddhism is properly understood as an integral part of the 
dispute resolution process, and it is inextricable from social relationships 
and community organization. 
The idea of a somroh-somruel process to address the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge has yet to be thoroughly explored.  Would this be an appropriate 
mechanism to address crimes of the DK era, particularly crimes of sexual 
violence against women?  Ultimately, communities seeking to address 
sexual violence through traditional reconciliation methods will have to 
balance the need to repair the social fabric through locally supported 
mechanisms against the desire to reject traditions that oppress women.  This 
tension leads to controversial questions that cut into the core of social 
traditions and community practices.  What do you preserve?  What do you 
change?   
This tension also warrants a careful weighing of the advantages and 
disadvantages of local justice.  Because it is familiar to most villagers, 
somroh-somruel could foster participation of both victims and perpetrators 
while involving the entire community.  Similarly, it could carry a high level 
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of legitimacy among local populations.  However, there is no guarantee that 
women’s grievances would be properly addressed in a somroh-somruel 
process without significant adaptations.  For example, even though somroh-
somruel has been used in situations of domestic violence, the level of 
women’s involvement in the actual mediation process is unclear.  And 
although Buddhist nuns, or duon chi, sometimes provide refuge to women 
victims of domestic violence, they do not usually play key roles in the 
resolution of the conflict itself.138  
Somroh-somruel could provide a framework to draw women into the 
overall reconciliation process and also to address crimes specific to their 
experience.  But an obvious requirement of a grassroots restorative justice 
mechanism designed to address crimes against women is that it be driven 
and controlled by women.  As the traditional gacaca process in Rwanda was 
modernized to give women greater control over the process, somroh-
somruel could be similarly adapted so that nuns, female village elders, or 
members of non-governmental organizations could figure more prominently 
in the process.  Rwanda’s gacaca process has shown that women serving in 
positions of power as the inyangamugayo often uphold the patriarchal 
values that oppress women; because of their detachment from village life, 
Buddhist nuns may be able to avoid replicating these traditional power 
structures.  Buddhist nuns are perceived as less political than monks and 
therefore less likely to be unduly influenced.  As most nuns are older 
women, a high percentage of nuns are also survivors of the Khmer Rouge 
regime and command a high level of respect among villagers across 
Cambodia.  These are powerful reasons for urging nuns to serve as 
mediators in a local process focusing on crimes against women. 
As Rwanda has done in formalizing its traditional gacaca dispute 
mechanism, Cambodians could incorporate modern procedural protections 
into somroh-somruel to ensure that women are not re-victimized by the 
reconciliation process itself.  First, cases involving sexual violence could be 
heard by a nun serving in the role of mediator, rather than a monk or male 
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elder.  Additionally, women could choose to conduct the hearing in private 
in order to minimize the shame that would arise in telling their stories 
publicly and the intimidation of confronting their perpetrators.  Other post-
conflict situations have shown that for many women, telling the stories of 
their rapes in public may be more painful than continuing to suppress their 
memories of the acts.  To be sure, this private approach would differ from 
the confrontational aspect of most transitional justice mechanisms, which 
seek a public disclosure of the truth as the path towards social 
reconciliation.  But it would also recognize the concept that the crime of 
rape causes different kinds of harm than other crimes of war, and as such 
demands a different approach.  In short, a private hearing may calm the 
natural dissonance between the private act of rape and the public event of 
retelling it. 
3.  Creative Approaches 
DC-Cam’s documentary film about Tang Kim’s life models a new 
approach to reconciliation that holds promise for victims of sexual violence, 
particularly in the context of patriarchal societies.  The film presents a 
condensed version of one individual’s reconciliation process.  Exploring a 
broad range of emotions, the victim wrestles with the conflict between 
facing her past and burying it.  At the beginning of the documentary, Tang 
Kim desires that her persecutors suffer as much as she did; she expresses 
her anger towards the Khmer Rouge soldiers by declaring, “Take them all to 
be killed so that I can have some peace.”139 After a while, she begins to 
believe that she could reconcile with her perpetrators if they confessed their 
crimes publicly.  The process of telling her story on camera transforms her 
desire for revenge into an overriding desire for peace.  In the end, she 
decides to enter the monastery so that she will be sheltered from the 
judgments and recriminations of villagers who now know her past.  “I am 
happy here [at the pagoda].  In the village, it was too noisy from the people 
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fighting and quarreling.  Here, we only hear the sounds of chanting . . . . 
Everyone seeks the truth.”140   
Expressing her narrative through the medium of a documentary, rather 
than through a public confrontation with her perpetrators, grants Tang Kim 
a certain freedom from cultural constraints.  She is at times angry, confused, 
and demanding, but noticeably uncensored.  Tang Kim herself did not agree 
to speak publicly about the film after it was made.  “I think it is better if I 
don’t reveal my story.  That way, people will not know who I am, and I will 
feel more at peace.”141  She clearly does not want to endure the pain of 
retelling her story until she is assured that she can face her perpetrators and 
demand answers; she explains, “If they admit their actions, it would be up 
to me to forgive them or not.”142  The film preserves the story, thereby 
accomplishing two goals at the same time. It retains its power to impact 
new viewers with the force of her narrative at every screening while also 
releasing Tang Kim from the burden of retelling it and reactivating the pain 
of those events.  
DC-Cam’s plan to screen “The Khmer Rouge Rice Fields” in 
communities across Cambodia will illuminate the role of art and new media 
in the process of reconciliation. This experiment breaks new ground in 
several ways.  First, the film can spark community discussions about a 
buried piece of history and the taboo topic of sexual crimes. Second, 
because the film does not endorse one answer to the question of how to find 
accountability for perpetrators of rape, it can spur local populations to 
address the barriers within their communities and debate potential solutions.  
Third, the film can serve as a gateway for communities to address their 
concerns and hopes about the broader issues of accountability and 
reconciliation in Cambodia.  Fourth, this film can validate victims’ stories 
of rape even before they choose to tell them and thereby encourage other 
women to share their experiences with sexual violence under the Khmer 
Rouge.  As Rachana Phat, the film’s director, explains: “Women must be 
given a chance to share their stories of tremendous hardships to remind 
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others that they are not alone in their sufferings.”143  It serves the goal of 
individual reconciliation for Tang Kim and other women who struggle 
against the weight of social constraints, repressed memories, and the fear of 
conjuring a dark history.  As a popular education tool, “The Khmer Rouge 
Rice Fields” also spurs social reconciliation by teaching Cambodians about 
the unique experiences of women in the DK era.  In this way, the film itself 
becomes a grassroots mechanism for reconciliation.   
Finally, a discussion about rape in the past begs the question about rape 
in Cambodia today.  As discussed in Section II (D), survivors of rape in 
Cambodia are re-victimized by the country’s hostile legal system.  
Untrained legal professionals, unbridled corruption, and barriers to access 
for the poor contribute to this hostile legal culture.  The film cannot address 
these problems, but it can challenge patriarchal views that blame women 
victims for the crime of rape.  These views abound in Cambodian culture 
and influence the way that judges apply the law, even when the law itself 
would protect women.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
Cambodian views towards reconciliation have constantly evolved since 
the Khmer Rouge regime fell.  Most Cambodians now accept that 
reconciliation cannot be possible without some form of accountability.  The 
latest step towards accountability and reconciliation with the creation of the 
Extraordinary Chambers has already spurred a robust conversation about 
what Cambodians want and need for reconciliation, both in the short and 
long-term and at the individual and social level.  For the first time since 
1979, the international community has committed to help Cambodia face its 
past.  International legal experts, lawyers, and judges stand ready to lend 
their expertise to the EC in hopes of finding accountability for Khmer 
Rouge victims and building the historical record to address one of the most 
murderous regimes in world history.   
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Although the road to justice and reconciliation will be long for victims of 
sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge, time and opportunity still exist to 
remedy the omissions from the historical record and hold accountable the 
perpetrators of rape and other gender-based crimes. Adopting rules of 
procedure that protect victims and witnesses will send a strong message to 
Cambodians that the process encourages their participation.  Institutional 
mechanisms, such as a unit within the EC to address the needs of special 
victims, can help remedy the EC’s current flaws. True, these adjustments 
will require additional resources, but the return on the long-term investment 
will exceed the short-term costs.  These changes will promote both greater 
public participation in the EC trials and renew Cambodians’ long-term trust 
in the legal system.  And even if few prosecutions for rape are obtained at 
the EC, the effort to train Cambodian investigators, prosecutors, and judges 
to responsibly prosecute crimes of sexual violence promises a lasting 
impact on the Cambodian legal system, such as improved accommodations 
for the special needs of rape victims, better application of existing rape 
laws, and legislative action to strengthen victims’ rights.  
The good news is that the momentum has already begun, mainly through 
creative approaches within civil society.  DC-Cam’s documentary film, in 
which a brave Cambodian publicly acknowledges for the first time that rape 
occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime, is an example of this bold effort 
to face the past and the legacy that lives on today.  Cambodians also have 
the advantage of learning from the experiences of women in other post-
conflict situations such as Rwanda, South Africa, East Timor and Sierra 
Leone.  These courageous women have drawn attention to the particular 
ways that women suffer during war, have educated local populations about 
the legacy of sexual violence, and are working towards lasting cultural and 
legal reform within their own societies.   
Cambodian women face a long road towards accountability in a 
patriarchal culture that still regards rape as shameful, and in a legal culture 
that lacks the tools to hold perpetrators of rape accountable.  Indeed, part of 
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Tang Kim’s burden was feeling isolated and alone as she struggled to come 
to terms with her past in a society that did not yet have the tools to receive 
her story.  Deciphering what happened to women under the Khmer Rouge 
not only promises accountability for women like Tang Kim, but also has the 
potential to fundamentally change the culture of impunity for rape 
perpetrators in Cambodia today.  In this way, the EC is best viewed as the 
beginning, rather than the end, of Cambodia’s reconciliation story.  As 
Steve Heder reminds us, “The notion of ‘closure’ is antithetical to the 
pursuit of truth and understanding, and therefore, ultimately to justice and 
prevention.”144  Whatever the outcome, the EC will undoubtedly illuminate 
what more needs to be done in the long pursuit of justice and reconciliation 
for Cambodia. 
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